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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate dividend policy should strike a balance between paying cash to shareholders when 
there are excess resources and retaining sufficient resources in the company to fund worthwhile 
projects. Using excess resources to pay dividends can help to avoid overinvestment by the 
company in inappropriate projects and/or other potential misuse of funds by managers for their 
own benefit. However, companies also need to avoid paying too much in dividends to ensure that 
adequate resources are available within the company to fund projects that could increase 
shareholder wealth (i.e., to avoid underinvestment). Cross-listing of company shares can improve 
governance and oversight, which may make the dividend policies of cross-listed companies more 
likely to avoid both over and underinvestment. 
 
Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2011, we find that cross-listed 
companies pay higher dividends than non-cross-listed companies when there are excess resources 
(measured by free cash flow), thereby reducing the potential for overinvestment/misuse of the 
resources by cross-listed companies. We also find that the dividends of cross-listed companies are 
lower than those of non-cross-listed companies when there are greater growth opportunities 
(measure by the market-to-book ratio), reflecting the reduced potential for underinvestment by 
cross-listed companies. We find more limited evidence that cross-listings may influence the 
relationship between dividend volatility and free cash flow and growth opportunities. Overall, our 
results suggest that companies cross-listing their shares have dividend policies that are more 
responsive than those of non-cross-listed companies to potential shareholder concerns about over 
and underinvestment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
gency theory posits that corporate management may engage in behavior that is good for the 
managers themselves (i.e., the agent), but could be harmful for the shareholders (i.e., the principal) 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Examples of activities that may benefit managers but harm shareholders 
include managerial overcompensation and investments in projects that will enhance managerial compensation 
(Jensen, 1986) and prestige (Fairchild, 2010), but which may not benefit shareholders (i.e., overinvestment). One 
factor that has been viewed as exacerbating this overinvestment problem is high free cash flow. The cash flow may 
be misused by the managers for their own benefit (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000), and this potential misuse of resources 
is called the “free cash flow problem” (e.g., Fuller & Blau, 2010). One way to reduce the free cash flow problem is 
to pay out more of the free cash flow as dividends (Fairchild, 2010), thereby sending the cash to the shareholders 
and reducing the chance that the managers may use the available resources inappropriately. 
 
Growth opportunities have been found to influence dividend policy in the opposite direction from free cash 
flow (e.g., Mitton, 2004; Abor & Bopkin, 2010). Companies with greater growth opportunities are more likely to 
A 
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pay lower (or no) dividends. The lower dividends permit companies to take advantage of the growth opportunities, 
as the resources not paid out as dividends (i.e., retained by the company) can be used to fund profitable projects 
which take advantage of the available growth opportunities. If lower dividend payments are not in place when 
growth opportunities are stronger, underinvestment in worthwhile projects may result (Guttman et al., 2010). 
 
Shareholder-friendly dividend policies would therefore strike a balance between paying out dividends from 
free cash flow, while still retaining sufficient resources to fund worthwhile projects. Against such shareholder-
friendly dividend policies is the potential for managers to act in their own self-interest in two possible ways. First, 
managers could pay lower or no dividends when the company has high free cash flow and use the retained resources 
for projects that would detract from shareholder value such as “unnecessary perks [and] unwarranted acquisitions 
and expansions” (Mukherjee & Baker, 2009). Second, managers could pay out excessively high dividends when the 
resources used to fund the dividends could be better utilized by investing in projects that could enhance shareholder 
value. 
 
One means of mitigating potential agency conflicts is through cross-listing of the company’s shares. 
Companies cross-listing their shares subject themselves to greater scrutiny by foreign shareholders and foreign 
regulators, which can enhance the chance that managers of cross-listed companies will be more attuned to the needs 
of shareholders (Reese & Weisbach, 2002). This potential for cross-listing to enhance managers’ shareholder focus 
is termed “bonding” (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002). Through enhanced bonding, cross-listings have also been 
found to enhance corporate governance (Charitou et al., 2007) and firm value (Doidge et al., 2004). 
 
Companies focused on shareholder interests will tend to have higher dividends when there is more free 
cash flow in order to limit the ability of managers to make inappropriate investment decisions (Jensen, 1986; 
Fairchild, 2010), but have lower dividends when there are greater growth opportunities in order to retain resources to 
fund the growth opportunities (Abor & Bopkin, 2010; Baker et al., 2012). One way of enhancing the chance that 
managers will better serve shareholder interests is through cross-listing of shares, which can enhance the scrutiny of 
the cross-listed company by both shareholders and regulatory bodies (Reese & Wiesbach, 2002). Thus, we predict 
that the dividends of companies that cross-list their shares respond more (in a positive direction) to free cash flow 
than dividends of non-cross-listed companies. Similarly, we expect that the dividends of cross-listed firms respond 
more (in a negative direction) to growth opportunities than the dividends of non-cross-listed companies. 
 
Using a sample of Chinese companies, we assess the potential effects of cross-listing on the relationship 
between free cash flow and dividend policy and between growth opportunities and dividend policy. We use Chinese 
companies for three main reasons. First, investor protection is viewed as weaker in China than that in other markets 
(Allen et al., 2005). When investor protection is weak in the home (i.e., Chinese) market, cross-listing of shares may 
be of greater benefit to shareholders (Zhou et al., 2011). Second, the Chinese stock market is fairly large, and cross-
listing occurs with a reasonable frequency among Chinese companies,
1
 allowing for a reasonable sample size. 
Finally, Chinese companies are more likely to pay dividends than companies from other countries (Lam et al., 2012), 
allowing for more variation among dividends in the Chinese market than in some other markets where many 
companies pay no dividends at all (Fama & French, 2001). 
 
Based on our sample of Chinese companies over the period from 2003 to 2011, we find that Chinese cross-
listed companies pay higher dividends than non-cross listed companies when they have greater free cash flow. We 
also find that Chinese cross-listed companies pay lower dividends than non-cross listed companies when they have 
greater growth opportunities. These results suggest that the enhanced governance associated with cross-listing may 
lead to dividend payments that enhance shareholder value by reducing the risk of both overinvestment (the free cash 
flow problem) and underinvestment (the growth opportunities idea). 
 
We also examine the impact exerted by cross-listings on the relationship between free cash flow and 
dividend volatility. We find some limited evidence that dividends of cross-listed companies are more volatile than 
the dividends of non-cross-listed companies when free cash flow is higher. We also find limited evidence that the 
                                                             
1 As presented in our results section below, 1,105 firm-years observations out of a total of 13,362 (i.e., 8.26%) of Chinese-listed companies in our 
sample have cross-listed shares. 
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dividends of cross-listed companies are more volatile than those of non-cross-listed companies when there are 
greater growth opportunities. The dividend payments may be more volatile because the cross-listed companies’ 
dividends are more responsive to free cash flow and growth opportunities, and these free cash flows and growth 
opportunities could vary over time. 
 
We contribute to the literature in three important ways. First, we assess whether the effects of the free cash 
flow and growth opportunities on dividend size may be influenced by share cross-listing. Second, we examine the 
relationships among free cash flow, growth opportunities, and cross listing on dividend volatility to capture an 
alternative measure of a company’s dividend policy. Finally, we contribute to the body of literature on cross-listings 
by assessing whether the dividend policies of cross-listed companies may be more in accord with shareholders’ 
interests in avoiding overinvestment and underinvestment. 
 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Free Cash Flow, Cross-Listings, and Dividend Policies 
 
Higher cash flows can benefit corporations by permitting them to use internally-generated capital to invest 
in projects with positive net present value that will enhance shareholder wealth. However, if available cash flows are 
greater than the amount needed to take advantage of shareholder-wealth-increasing projects, managers may invest in 
projects that will detract from firm value (Jensen, 1986; Noronha et al., 1995). By investing in projects unlikely to 
increase shareholder wealth (i.e., overinvesting), self-interested managers may act for their own benefit,
2
 rather than 
for the interests of the shareholders, thereby creating agency costs (La Porta et al., 2000; Mukherjee & Baker, 2009). 
Richardson (2006) suggests that overinvestment is more likely to occur when companies have more free cash flow. 
Possible means of reducing the agency conflicts associated with excess free cash flow include more institutional 
shareholding (Karpavicius & Yu, 2012), higher debt (Jensen, 1986), and stronger external auditing (Griffin et al., 
2010). 
 
Another mechanism to reduce the potential agency costs associated with excess cash flows (i.e., to avoid 
the free cash flow problem) is for the free cash flow to be distributed to shareholders as higher dividends. Jensen 
(1986, p. 323), however, notes the potential difficulty of convincing managers to pay out excess cash flow to 
shareholders as dividends: 
 
“Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when the 
organization generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash 
rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies.” 
 
One means of encouraging managers to “disgorge the cash” (Jensen, 1986, p. 323) (i.e., pay the excess cash 
flow as dividends) is through enhanced corporate governance. Research has found that companies with higher 
quality corporate governance have higher dividend payout ratios (e.g., Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010; Jiraporn et al., 
2011), which can reduce the agency costs associated with higher free cash flow. 
 
Companies cross-listing their shares subject themselves to greater scrutiny from foreign investors and 
foreign regulatory bodies, and this scrutiny can result in better quality corporate governance (Charitou et al., 2007). 
Better quality governance can enhance the protection of shareholder rights through a stronger control consciousness 
and greater managerial focus on shareholder concerns. Supporting the stronger shareholder emphasis among cross-
listed companies, Frésard and Salva (2010) find that cross-listings can enhance company value by making it more 
difficult for the managers to use corporate resources for their “private beneﬁt” (Frésard & Salva, 2010, p. 359). 
 
Cross-listed companies may be more sensitive to shareholder concerns about potential overinvestment of 
excess free cash flow than would non-cross-listed companies. We therefore expect an interactive relationship among 
cross-listing status, free cash flow, and the size of dividend payments. Specifically, we expect that the dividends of 
                                                             
2 Managers may invest in these sub-optimal projects to “empire build” (Fairchild, 2010, p. 395), and/or to obtain higher compensation as the 
company grows in size (Jensen 1986). 
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cross-listed firms will be more responsive to free cash flow than the dividends of non-cross-listed companies. In 
other words, the relationship between free cash flow and dividends is expected to be stronger (more positive) for 
cross-listed companies than for non-cross-listed companies. This expectation is reflected in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The dividend payments of cross-listed companies respond more positively to free cash flow than 
the dividend payments of non-cross-listed companies. 
 
In addition to the size of dividends, the volatility of dividends could reflect differences in dividend policy 
choices among companies (Lintner, 1956). However, the interactive effects of cross-listing and free cash flow on 
dividend volatility are more complex than their potential effects on dividend size. One possibility is that cross-listed 
firms may have less volatile dividend payments than non-cross-listed firms when free cash flow is higher. Gugler 
(2003) find that steady dividend policies can be used as a tool to constrain managers from turning free cash flow into 
private benefits in Austrian state-owned companies. Stable dividend streams will keep the cash flowing consistently 
to the shareholders and keep the resources out of the hands of the managers who may misuse them. Cross-listed 
companies are likely to be more sensitive to shareholder concerns, and therefore, may be more likely to use steady 
dividend payments as a tool to mitigate the potential agency problems associated with higher free cash flow. 
 
However, another possibility arises when we factor in the prediction of Hypothesis H1a. Hypothesis H1a 
predicts that the dividend payments of cross-listed firms are more sensitive to free cash flow, and this sensitivity 
may cause greater dividend volatility among cross-listed companies because the free cash flows vary over time. Also, 
because cross-listed firms may make higher dividend payments when free cash flow is higher, it will be more 
difficult for cross-listed firms to keep stable dividend policies. Higher dividend payments are more difficult to 
sustain due to the lower availability of slack resources in the organization, especially during economic downturns. 
Therefore, the dividend payments of cross-listed companies may be more volatile relative to free cash flow than the 
dividend payments of non-cross-listed companies. 
 
Finally, the two effects (i.e., either lower volatility due to the need to mitigate potential agency problem or 
higher volatility due to the difficulty of sustaining higher payments) could offset each other, resulting in no 
interactive relationship between cross-listing, free cash flow and dividend volatility. Because of these competing 
predictions, we propose a non-directional (i.e., null) hypothesis for the interactive relationship among free cash flow, 
cross-listings and dividend volatility as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is no interactive relationship between cross-listing, free cash flow and the companies’ 
dividend volatility. 
 
2.2 Growth Opportunity, Cross-Listings, and Dividend Policies 
 
The free cash flow problem is based on concerns that managers may keep too much cash which they may 
invest in inappropriate projects. However, companies with greater growth opportunities could profitably invest the 
free cash flow in projects that take advantage of these growth opportunities. Therefore, companies with better 
growth opportunities may retain more resources to take advantage of the growth opportunities. Consistent with this 
notion, research indicates that companies with greater growth opportunities pay lower dividends (Abor & Bopkin, 
2010) or no dividends (Baker et al., 2012). Similarly, Fama and French (2001) find that the general decrease in 
dividend payments from 1978 to 1999 is associated with an increase in the number of companies with better growth 
opportunities. 
 
La Porta et al. (2000) and Mitton (2004) both suggest that the negative relationship between dividends and 
growth opportunities will be stronger when corporate governance and shareholder protection (which can be 
enhanced by cross-listing) are better. Therefore, cross-listed companies with higher growth prospects may retain 
more cash (i.e., pay lower dividends) than non-cross-listed companies in order to invest in the available growth 
opportunities. Investors would accept these lower dividend payouts in exchange for the prospect of better returns 
when the investments pay off. We therefore expect an interactive relationship between cross-listing status, growth 
opportunities, and the size of dividend payments, as reflected in the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2a: The dividend payments of cross-listed companies respond more negatively to growth opportunities 
than the dividend payments of non-cross-listed companies. 
 
In addition to their potential effects on dividend size, growth opportunities could also influence the 
volatility of dividends. For example, Gugler (2003) and Leary and Michaely (2010) find that companies with lower 
growth opportunities have less volatile dividend payments. These findings may reflect the reduced competition 
between dividends and investments for resources when companies have fewer growth opportunities. This reduced 
competition for resources could help these firms make dividend payments on a more consistent basis. Consistent 
with Gugler (2003) and Leary and Michaely (2010), Mukherjee and Baker (2009) argue that it is more difficult for 
firms with better growth prospects to sustain dividends at a steady level since “a firm’s investment needs . . . might 
fluctuate from one year to the next.” 
 
Cross-listing is expected to enhance the shareholder focus of companies, so cross-listed companies (as 
predicted by H2a) may be more likely to retain resources to allow them to take advantage of growth opportunities 
that could benefit shareholders. However, these growth opportunities could vary across time. Therefore, we expect 
that cross-listed firms with better growth prospects may follow more volatile dividend policies because they are 
more likely to retain resources to take advantage of good projects and the availability of these projects can vary 
across time. This is the final hypothesis of our study and is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Dividends of companies with strong growth opportunities are more volatile for cross-listed 
companies than for non-cross-listed companies. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
We obtained data from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) on dividend 
size and volatility, companies’ cross-listing status, free cash flow, growth opportunities and various control variables, 
such as the ownership structure, profitability, financial leverage, and size. We collect data for Chinese public firms 
in the CSMAR database for the period from 2003 to 2011. We exclude financial firms because their financial and 
accounting characteristics are different from those of firms from other industries. We also exclude companies listed 
on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) because the GEM was established in 2009, leaving insufficient data to 
measure the volatility of these companies’ dividends. We also require five-year lag data to construct the dividend 
volatility measures (which for observations from the year 2003 requires data as early as 1999). These data 
restrictions yielded a sample of 13,362 firms-year observations, with 1,105 firm-year observations representing 
cross-listed companies, and 12,257 observations representing non-cross-listed companies. 
 
3.2 Main Variables and Models 
 
Table 1 displays the variables used in our models and their definitions. We employ three proxies for 
dividend size. The first proxy is a dummy variable DPi,t (dividend payment) which equals one if a firm makes 
dividend payments and zero otherwise. Two continuous variables are also used to measure dividend size: dividend-
to-sales ratio (DSi,t) and dividend-to-equity ratio (DEi,t). These proxies for dividend policies are widely used in many 
studies (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000). For the dummy dependent variable (DPi,t), we employ a pooled Logit analysis. 
For the continuous dependent variables (DSi,t and DEi,t), a large number of observations have the value of 0 (i.e., the 
variables are left censored). For these continuous dependent variables, we use pooled Tobit models, which are more 
appropriate than OLS regression when many observations have a zero value. 
 
In order to measure dividend volatility, the standard deviations of DSi,t and DEi,t (by company) over a 
rolling five year period (StdDSi,t and StdDEi,t) are calculated. For instance, dividend volatility in 2003 is computed 
based on data from 1999 to 2003. A five-year period is chosen because it is considered long enough for a company 
to establish a dividend policy (Gwilym et al., 2000). In China, many listed firms pay no dividend to shareholders 
during the five-year periods. These firms, together with the firms that make unchanged dividend payments, have the 
most stable dividend policy. Therefore, (similar to the dividend size measure of DSi,t and DEi,t) the dividend 
volatility variables (StdDSi,t and StdDEi,t) are also left censored at 0. We first conduct an analysis of dividend 
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volatility using pooled Tobit model on the full sample. We then exclude firms that pay no dividends to shareholders 
in the rolling five-year period to create a reduced sample. This step is necessary to distinguish companies that do not 
pay dividends at all from companies that pay very stable dividends. We use pooled OLS model on this reduced 
sample to examine dividend volatility among these dividend-paying companies. 
 
We create a dummy variable (CLi,t) to measure cross-listing status of the company; this variable equals one 
if a company cross-lists their shares and zero otherwise. We use the size of free cash flow divided by the book value 
of total assets to measure companies’ free cash flows (FCFi,t). The growth opportunity measure (GOi,t) we use is 
market-to-book ratio, which is also used in many other studies of dividend policies (e.g. Chae et al., 2009). The first 
step in our analysis is to examine whether the correlations between free cash flow and growth opportunities and 
dividend size and stability vary based on the company’s cross-listing status. 
 
To test Hypothesis 1a and 1b (which posit an interactive relationship between cross-listing status and free cash flow) 
we use the interaction variable CL*FCFi,t in our models of dividend size (to test H1a) and dividend volatility (to test 
H1b). Hypotheses 2a and 2b posit that cross-listing could interact with growth opportunities to influence dividend 
size and volatility. We include the interaction variable CLi,t*GOi,t in our models of dividend size (testing H2a) and 
volatility (testing H2b). 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
DPi,t If a firm makes dividend payments then DPi,t = 1, otherwise DPi,t = 0. 
DSi,t Cash dividends as a percentage of sales. 
DEi,t Cash dividends as a percentage of book value of equity. 
StdDSi,t Rolling standard deviation of DSi,t of previous five years. 
StdDEi,t Rolling standard deviation of DEi,t of previous five years. 
CLi,t If a firm cross-lists its stocks in other markets, then CLi,t = 1, otherwise CLi,t = 0 
FCFi,t 
FCFi,t = (earnings + interest expense on debt + non-cash expense - the change in working capital from the 
previous year to the current year - capital expenditure) / book value of total assets. 
GOi,t Market to book ratio of equity 
SOEi,t If a firm is state-owned, then SOEi,t = 1, otherwise SOEi,t = 0 
S10i,t Percentage of shares held by top ten investors 
ROEi,t Earnings divided by book value of equity 
Levi,t Book value of liability divided by book value of assets 
Sizei,t Log (book value of total assets) 
 
Our multivariate analysis includes control variables for other factors that could influence company’s 
dividend policies. Consistent with Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Lam et al. (2012), we control ownership 
concentration as a factor in dividend policy. We employ S10i,t, which reflects the percentage of shares held by the 
top ten investors as a proxy for the ownership concentration. We also control for state ownership because Chen et al. 
(2009) suggest that Chinese state-owned firms tend to pay higher dividends and because Gugler (2003) find that 
state-owned companies are more likely to smooth dividend payments. Therefore, we include a binary variable 
(SOEi,t) in our analysis to control for the potential effects of state ownership on dividend policy. SOEi,t equals one if 
the company’s largest owner is a governmental (i.e., state) entity, and zero otherwise. 
 
Finally, we also control for other firm-level characteristics in our regression analysis, including profitability, 
leverage, and firm size. We employ the return on equity ratio (ROEi,t) as the proxy for profitability. The financial 
leverage measure we use is debt/asset ratio (Levi,t), while the log of total assets is used to measure the firm size 
(Sizei,t). Year dummies and industry dummies are also included in our multivariate analysis. We winsorize all 
variables except CLi,t, SOEi,t, S10i,t, and Sizei,t at 1% in each tail in order to reduce the effect of outliers. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Correlation Analysis 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between free cash flow and the various 
measures of dividend policy, with the observations divided into cross-listed and non-cross-listed sub-samples. For 
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the cross-listed companies, free cash flow and dividend payments (DPi,t, DSi,t, and DEi,t) are positively correlated, 
while free cash flow and dividend payments are negatively related in the non-cross-listed sub-sample. The 
differences in these correlations between the cross-listed and non-cross-listed sub-samples are statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with our expectation in H1a that the dividends of cross-listed companies 
respond more strongly to free cash flow. Regarding dividend volatility, free cash flow is positively related to 
dividend volatility (StdDSi,t, and StdDEi,t) in both the cross-listed and the non-cross-listed sub-samples. The 
correlations are significantly larger in the cross-listed sub-sample than in the non-cross-listed sub-sample. All of 
these free cash flow/dividend correlation results indicate that the dividend policies of cross-listed firms respond 
more strongly to free cash flow than do the dividends of non-cross-listed companies. 
 
Table 2: A Comparison of Correlation Coefficients between Free Cash Flow, Growth Opportunities  
and Dividend Policies by Cross-Listing Status 
Panel  A: Correlations with Free Cash Flow 
 
Cross-Listed 
Companies 
Non-Cross Listed 
Companies 
Test of Difference between Correlation 
Coefficients 
 Z Prob > Z 
DPi,t 0.2149
*** -0.0664*** 9.06*** 0.0000 
DSi,t 0.2222
*** -0.1046*** 10.52*** 0.0000 
DEi,t 0.2613
*** -0.0046 8.65*** 0.0000 
StdDSi,t  0.2107
*** 0.0860*** 3.79*** 0.0001 
StdDEi,t,  0.2143
*** 0.1199*** 2.88*** 0.0010 
StdDSi,t (reduced sample) 0.1717
*** 0.0493*** 3.09*** 0.0010 
StdDEi,t (reduced sample) 0.1443
*** 0.0808*** 1.60* 0.0548 
Panel B: Correlations with Growth Opportunities (Market to Book Ratio) 
 
Cross-Listed 
Companies 
Non-Cross Listed 
Companies 
Test of Difference between Correlation 
Coefficients 
 Z Prob > Z 
DPi,t -0.3012
*** -0.1360*** -5.53*** 0.0000 
DSi,t -0.1202
*** -0.0242*** -3.07*** 0.0011 
DEi,t -0.1206
*** -0.0047 -3.70*** 0.0001 
StdDSi,t  -0.1668
*** -0.1240*** -1.30* 0.0968 
StdDEi,  -0.1396
*** -0.0928*** -1.41* 0.0793 
StdDSi,t (reduced sample) 0.0495 -0.0064 1.39
* 0.0823 
StdDEi,t (reduced sample) 0.2375
*** 0.1171*** 3.10*** 0.0010 
Variable Definitions: See Table 1. In the reduced sample, we excluded companies that pay no dividends to shareholders over a continuous five-
year period. The p values are one-tailed for the directional hypotheses. *, **, ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between growth opportunities and dividend 
policies for the cross-listed and non-cross-listed sub-samples. Growth opportunities are negatively related to 
dividend size for both the cross-listed and non-cross-listed samples. As expected, however, the correlations between 
growth opportunities and dividend size are more negative in the cross-listed sub-sample than in the non-cross-listed 
sub-sample. The correlation results between growth opportunities and dividend volatility are mixed. When we 
include companies regardless of whether they pay dividends or not, we find significantly negative correlations 
between growth opportunities and dividend volatility. These correlations are (opposite to our expectation) more 
negative for the cross-listed sub-sample than for the non-cross-listed sub-sample, but this difference is only 
marginally significant. When we exclude companies that pay no dividends over a rolling five-year window (the 
reduced sample), we find mostly positive correlations between growth opportunities and dividend volatility. We also 
find that the correlations for dividend paying companies between growth opportunities and dividend volatility differ 
between the cross-listed and non-cross-listed sub-samples (with marginal significance for StdDSi,t and significance at 
p ≤ 0.01 for StdDEi,t). Overall, the correlation results are consistent with our expectations that the dividend policies 
of cross-listed firms are more sensitive to growth opportunities than are those of non-cross-listed firms. 
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4.2 Regression Analyses 
 
4.2.1 Free Cash Flow, Cross-Listing, and Dividends 
 
Table 3 presents the results examining the potential effects of free cash flow and cross-listing on dividend 
size and dividend volatility (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). The first three columns present the results of testing the 
potential interactive effects of free cash flow and cross-listings on dividend size. The coefficients on the CL*FCFi,t  
variable are significantly positive (at the 1% level) for all of three measures of dividend size (i.e., DPi,t, DSi,t, and 
DEi,t). These results are consistent with H1a, which posited that the dividends of cross-listed companies would 
respond more strongly to the companies’ free cash flow than the dividends of non-cross-listed companies. The 
findings are also consistent with the notion that the enhanced shareholder protection of cross-listed companies could 
force managers to pay higher dividends to shareholders when free cash flow is higher, thus constraining mangers 
from overinvesting the company’s resources in inappropriate projects. 
 
Table 3: The Interactive Effects of Cross-Listings and Free Cash Flow on Dividend Size and Volatility 
 Dividend Size Dividend Volatility 
 Logit Model Tobit Model Tobit Model (full sample) OLS Model (reduced sample) 
 (1) DPi,t (2) DSi,t (3) DEi,t (4) StdDSi,t (5) StdDEi,t (6) StdDSi,t (7)StdDEi,t 
CL*FCFi,t 3.2816*** 0.0882*** 0.0527*** 0.0111* 0.0115** 0.0011 0.0046 
 (4.7995) (6.6503) (5.7293) (1.6824) (2.5491) (0.1538) (1.0092) 
CLi,t -0.9998*** -0.0196*** -0.0144*** -0.0150*** -0.0093*** -0.0070*** -0.0027*** 
 (-10.1854) (-9.8900) (-10.5317) (-15.7517) (-14.4088) (-7.2051) (-4.2987) 
FCFi,t -0.3039*** -0.0105*** -0.0001 0.0142*** 0.0099*** 0.0071*** 0.0041*** 
 (-2.6365) (-5.1503) (-0.0903) (7.9816) (8.0914) (3.9920) (3.5343) 
GOi,t -0.1931*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0002** 0.0000 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 
 (-14.7014) (-9.5348) (-12.4087) (-2.3801) (0.0790) (6.6012) (13.2659) 
SOEi,t 0.1817*** 0.0054*** 0.0039*** 0.0014** 0.0018*** -0.0003 0.0012*** 
 (3.7270) (5.2193) (5.4713) (2.5696) (4.8218) (-0.5755) (3.3504) 
S10i,t 0.0233*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (14.3676) (16.8977) (18.4891) (9.4658) (12.1569) (7.0540) (9.5559) 
ROEi,t 13.3744*** 0.2618*** 0.2610*** -0.0005 0.0077*** -0.0046*** 0.0082*** 
 (33.4167) (36.9657) (51.8317) (-0.3990) (8.7114) (-3.2930) (9.0273) 
Levi,t -3.8866*** -0.1357*** -0.0646*** -0.0466*** -0.0186*** -0.0368*** -0.0059*** 
 (-25.7603) (-45.7958) (-31.7647) (-30.3267) (-17.7349) (-24.3113) (-5.9897) 
Sizei,t 1.5159*** 0.0245*** 0.0154*** 0.0168*** 0.0126*** 0.0039*** 0.0025*** 
 (21.2628) (19.0026) (17.2526) (25.1475) (27.7323) (5.9174) (5.8392) 
Constant -12.9976*** -0.2139*** -0.1387*** -0.1378*** -0.1101*** -0.0059 -0.0065 
 (-15.2822) (-13.3971) (-12.5385) (-10.7854) (-13.3951) (-0.6002) (-1.0001) 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
N 13362 13362 13362 10334 10334 7811 7811 
Adj-R2      0.2781 0.1246 
Chi2 5710.80 7001.14 7239.79 3703.15 2821.81   
Pseudo R2 0.3115       
Variable definitions: See Table 1. In the reduced sample, we excluded companies that pay no dividends to shareholders over a continuous five-
year period. In parentheses, we report z statistics for Logit model and t statistics for Tobit and OLS models. *, **, ***denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The last four columns of Table 3 present the results of testing the potential effects of cross-listing on the 
relationship between free cash flow and dividend volatility. In the Tobit model for the full sample, the coefficients of 
the interaction variable (CL*FCFi,t) are positive and marginally significant at 0.10 (StdDSi,t) and significant (StdDEi,t) 
at 0.05. The results in the Tobit analysis imply that the dividend policies of cross-listed firms are more volatile when 
they have higher free cash flow. One possible explanation for these results is that, as the dividend payments of cross-
listed firms are more sensitive to their free cash flows, managers of cross-listed firms could therefore increase 
(decrease) dividend payments when the company experiences increases (decreases) in their free cash flow and such 
dividend changes would increase the volatility of the companies’ dividends. In the OLS regressions for the reduced 
sample (excluding companies that do not pay dividends), the interaction variable (CL*FCFi,t) is not significant, 
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suggesting that the free cash flow/dividend volatility relationship is not different between companies that do and do 
not cross-list their shares. The dividend volatility results overall provide limited evidence that the relationship 
between free cash flow and dividends volatility may be influenced by cross-listing status. 
 
4.2.2 Growth Opportunity, Cross-Listing, and Dividends 
 
Table 4 presents the results of testing whether cross-listing may influence the relationship between growth 
opportunities and dividend size/volatility. The first three columns present the models of dividend size (testing H2a). 
All of the coefficients on the interaction term (CL*GOi,t) are negative and consistently significant. These results 
indicate that growth prospects are more negatively related to dividend payments for cross-listed companies than for 
non-cross-listed companies. These findings are consistent with H2a, which posits that cross-listed companies would 
be more likely than non-cross-listed companies to retain resources (rather than pay them out as dividends) when they 
have better growth opportunities. 
 
Table 4: The Interactive Effects of Cross-Listings and Growth Opportunities on Dividend Size and Volatility 
 Dividend Size Dividend Volatility 
 Logit Model Tobit Model Tobit Model (full sample) OLS Model (reduced sample) 
 (1) DPi,t (2) DSi,t (3) DEi,t (4) StdDSi,t (5) StdDEi,t (6) StdDSi,t (7)StdDEi,t 
CL*GOi,t -0.1714*** -0.0021** -0.0015*** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0007* 0.0010*** 
 (-3.7637) (-2.5676) (-2.7644) (-0.3201) (0.1605) (1.8088) (3.8756) 
CLi,t -0.4508*** -0.0095*** -0.0078*** -0.0141*** -0.0088*** -0.0085*** -0.0046*** 
 (-3.2155) (-3.6147) (-4.3321) (-11.7189) (-10.9231) (-6.9465) (-5.7998) 
FCFi,t -0.2177* -0.0086*** 0.0010 0.0150*** 0.0107*** 0.0071*** 0.0044*** 
 (-1.9351) (-4.2407) (0.7278) (8.6804) (9.0463) (4.1404) (3.8780) 
GOi,t -0.1873*** -0.0024*** -0.0021*** -0.0002** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 
 (-14.1885) (-9.1753) (-12.0189) (-2.2513) (0.0663) (6.1968) (12.4263) 
SOEi,t 0.1792*** 0.0053*** 0.0038*** 0.0014** 0.0018*** -0.0003 0.0011*** 
 (3.6781) (5.0488) (5.3352) (2.5273) (4.7528) (-0.6095) (3.2583) 
S10i,t 0.0233*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (14.3760) (16.9511) (18.5419) (9.4653) (12.1560) (7.0179) (9.4887) 
ROEi,t 13.5073*** 0.2645*** 0.2627*** -0.0005 0.0077*** -0.0046*** 0.0081*** 
 (33.5330) (37.1826) (51.9713) (-0.3904) (8.6898) (-3.3417) (8.9266) 
Levi,t -3.8649*** -0.1363*** -0.0649*** -0.0467*** -0.0187*** -0.0369*** -0.0062*** 
 (-25.6111) (-45.8535) (-31.8451) (-30.3435) (-17.8252) (-24.3947) (-6.2263) 
Sizei,t 1.4965*** 0.0243*** 0.0152*** 0.0168*** 0.0127*** 0.0039*** 0.0026*** 
 (20.9064) (18.7823) (17.0306) (25.1252) (27.7690) (6.0101) (6.0581) 
Constant -13.0572*** -0.2023*** -0.1340*** -0.1244*** -0.0953*** -0.0063 -0.0070 
 (-16.4082) (-12.8948) (-12.3925) (-11.2177) (-12.5079) (-0.6412) (-1.0881) 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
N 13362 13362 13362 10334 10334 7811 7811 
Adj-R2      0.2784 0.1262 
Chi2 5701.94 6961.06 7212.83 3700.38 2815.19   
Pseudo R2 0.3110       
Variable Definitions: See Table 1. In the reduced sample, we excluded companies that pay no dividends to shareholders over a continuous five-
year period. In parentheses, we report z statistics for Logit model and t statistics for Tobit and OLS models. *, **, ***denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The final four columns of Table 4 present the different models of dividend volatility (testing H2b). The 
coefficient on the interaction variable (CL*GOi,t), provides limited evidence (in the OLS models only) that dividend 
volatility responds more strongly to growth opportunities for cross-listed companies. These findings provide some 
weak evidence in support of H2b, which suggests that the dividend payments of cross-listed companies may be more 
volatile than those of non-cross-listed companies when growth opportunities are higher. 
 
4.3 Limitations 
 
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, we examined the cross-listing status of Chinese 
companies, which tend to pay relatively high dividends (Lam et al., 2012). Cross-listing by companies from other 
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emerging markets may not influence the free cash flow/dividend policy and growth opportunities/dividend policy 
relationships in the same way. Second, in addition to free cash flow and growth opportunities, cross-listings could 
influence the relationship between dividend policy and other factors such as the ownership structure and profitability. 
An extension of this paper could examine the moderating effect of cross-listings on the relationship between these 
variables and dividend policies. Finally, we did not attempt to measure share repurchases, which are viewed as a 
substitute for dividends by some researchers in the US market (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). These limitations 
represent opportunities for future research. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Resources generated by an organization through its profit-making activities can be allocated to two 
competing uses: to pay dividends or to make investments. A company’s dividend policy should therefore respond to 
two main factors: the available resources, and the availability of projects that could benefit shareholders (Guttman et 
al., 2010). If the company retains resources in excess of their potential use for productive projects (i.e., the company 
does not pay enough dividends), the cash retained within the business may be misused by management. This misuse 
may arise from investing in projects (or paying more in managerial compensation) that will not increase shareholder 
wealth, resulting in overinvestment. The potential overinvestment of resources that could have been paid out as 
dividends is known as the “free-cash flow problem.” However, if too much cash is paid out in dividends, some 
shareholder-wealth-increasing projects may not be pursued by the company due to scarcity of capital (i.e., 
underinvestment may occur). Cross-listed companies may be more shareholder-focused than their non-cross-listed 
counterparts, and thus their dividend policies may reflect a desire to avoid the free cash flow problem, while 
retaining sufficient resource to take advantage of growth opportunities. Therefore, cross-listed companies may 
structure their dividend policies to avoid both overinvestment and underinvestment. 
 
Consistent with avoidance of the free cash flow problem and the increased shareholder focus of cross-listed 
companies, we find that the dividend payments of Chinese cross-listed companies respond more strongly to free 
cash flow than do the dividend payments of non-cross-listed companies. Cross-listed companies are likely to pay out 
more of their free cash flow than non-cross-listed companies, which can prevent managers from misusing the 
resources in ways that may not maximize shareholder wealth. We also find limited evidence of an interactive 
relationship between free cash flow, cross-listings, and dividend volatility, with the dividend payments of cross-
listed companies being somewhat more volatile as they respond to changes in free cash flow. 
 
We also find evidence that the dividend policies of cross-listed companies are more likely to result in 
retention of resources that can be put to productive use. Specifically, the dividends of cross-listed companies are 
smaller than those of non-cross-listed companies when the company has greater growth opportunities. The resources 
not paid out as dividends can then be used to fund projects which take advantage of the greater growth opportunities. 
Additionally, we find some limited evidence that the dividends of cross-listed companies are more volatile than 
those of non-cross-listed companies when growth opportunities are larger. These results may reflect changes over 
time in the growth opportunities to which the dividend payments respond. 
 
Research suggests that companies that cross-list their shares may have better corporate governance 
(Charitou et al., 2007) and enhanced shareholder wealth (Doidge et al., 2004). The implications of our study are that 
cross-listed companies may be more likely to design dividend policies to encourage more appropriate investment of 
corporate resources. These cross-listed companies are less likely to overinvest or otherwise misuse free cash flow, as 
they pay more of the free cash flow out as dividends than non-cross-listed companies. Cross-listed companies are 
also less likely to underinvest in worthwhile projects, as cross-listed companies with stronger growth opportunities 
are more likely to retain corporate resources (rather than paid out as dividends) that can be used to fund these 
worthwhile projects. 
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